While the impact of the EU enlargement process on polities and policies of the candidate countries has been extensively analysed in the context of ongoing accession negotiations and the overtaking of the acquis communautaire, the question of the impact of enlargement on the political structures of interest representation (the politics dimension) remains marginal.
However, there can be no doubt that the European Union is having a profound impact on the domestic political patterns of the candidate states. The adaptation to the acquis communautaire, and the overtaking of legal and institutional solutions in a context of conditionality, has led some analysts to qualify the institutional transfer linked to it as imitation 1 . More and more researchers perceive the ongoing enlargement as part of the Europeanisation process, which at the beginning was broadly considered as earmarked for EU member countries, directly involved in the community rules. Still, Europeanisation is not synonymous with convergence and its inputs diverge depending, among other things, on institutional backgrounds 2 . Candidate countries adapt differently to EU pressures, according to their institutional past, structure of civil society, and perceptions of the opportunity structures in the EU.
This paper deals with a process, which may be called the Europeanisation of Polish political parties during their association to European party federations in the 1990s. To be more precise, the studied rule of European governance is the role of political parties at European level and the way in which the extension of European governance to Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) affects the perceptions and activities of party leaders from the candidate countries. By the term "role of political parties at EU level" is understood the interaction between different national parties within European party federations (characterised either by consensus building or dissent, the politicisation or depoliticisation of certain issues), which has been conceptualised as networking, the building of nodal points of contacts between party organisations. Political parties are actors in the process of searching for new partners from CEEC and their legitimisation on the European arena. As factors of integration, they become important channels of European norms and rules.
The enlargement pressures analysed do not refer to legal solutions or policy paradigms. On the contrary, they concern mainly immaterial elements relative to identity and perceptions of political elites, which makes the exact measure of the degree of change difficult.
Numerous analysts have noted that European integration may be conceptualised as a process of social construction. However, empirical research drawing on constructivist and sociological insights has remained a "poor relation" to European studies. It acquired its place in the theoretical reflection 3 or in hypothesis building on a macro scale; however, few researchers deigned to venture empirically onto the fields of norm diffusion to observe mechanisms of Europeanisation taking place on a micro scale. Thus, adjusting the focus to the transnational scale (parties, interest groups, transgovernmental actors or administrative subgroups), and especially paying attention to social learning processes could allow a finer analysis of the interactions taking place between the applicant and the EU institutions.
The EU enlargement may be analysed as a process of international socialisation to liberal norms 4 , therefore its study should encompass not only the "hard" elements of the transfer (rules, paradigms, ways of doing), but also the "soft" elements: ideas, beliefs, formal and informal norms 5 . While focusing on political party elites, we ask the question of mechanisms, which influence perceptions, discourses and political decisions and their evolution over time.
This article argues that Eastern Enlargement at the party level may be seen as a two-sided process, affecting both candidate state political parties and the parties at EU level. Political leaders from the candidate countries tend to be recognised by their European partners and to benefit from their material, but above all, nonmaterial resources. Party leaders in the European Parliament perceive their interlocutors from CEEC as future partners and allies, which could help them to overcome certain internal crises. In studying the mechanisms of compliance to EU rules and norms, this paper shows that EU enlargement makes difficult a distinction between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentiality. Drawing both on theoretical, institutionalist perspectives and on empirical evidence, it explains the way in which both these logics interfere with each other.
The aim of this case study is to throw light not so much on the essence of the CEEC party association process to European federations -which may be considered as marginal in the enlargement process, as compared to more visible legal or institutional transfers -but rather on its mechanisms. The delimitation of the empirical ground enables us to ask questions about the logic, channels, actors and instruments of change. It is obviously risky today to hypothesise about the impact of enlargement (politicians from the candidate states do not participate yet in collective decision-making within EU institutions). However, a few hypotheses can be made concerning the eventual impact of the analysed evolutions, with the reservation that they should be checked in the years to come, in a factually and not only hypothetically enlarged European Union
I. The EU enlargement impact on the political party leaders -conditions and variables.
Out of a range of actors, supranational, national, subnational, public and private, participating in the enlargement "composite" policy 6 , the European Parliament and the party federations are not considered the most influential. Attention is generally directed toward the European Commission, which managed to assert its leading position in the Enlargement policy from the beginning of the transformation process in CEEC 7 . Macro-policy and major or historic decisions are taken by representatives of the national governments during summits 8 .
This paper focuses on a rarely analysed channel of transfer of EU norms and informal rules:
the party network close to the European Parliament. Choosing to study the EU enlargement impact through the prism of political parties may seem paradoxical: On the one hand, party structures at the European level are known to have a limited impact on EU governance. The resources and the weight of parties in the European system are weak when compared to national parties 9 . Their legal position is far from being clear, notwithstanding the efforts made to underline the role played by European "parties" in the Maastricht Treaty. 10 The European
Parliament has remained a marginal institution in the EU governance nexus, although it has acquired more competences in the past few years. "The transnational party federations which were formed prior to the EP elections have been nothing more than clearing houses, providing information campaign materials and organising poorly attended conferences and candidate exchanges. Under the present institutional system the EP elections will only be 'second order national contests'" 11 .
On the other hand, however, the "European Union is run by party politicians"
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Be it in
Commission Directorates, the Council of Ministers or the European Council, most of the European leaders originate from political parties of the member states. Moreover, the enlargement context forces European party leaders to rethink the criteria applied to the candidates and the implications of the reforms to come on decision-making in the EU.
Therefore, "when a new country applies to join the EU, a long hard look is taken at its political parties and at its capacity to sustain a stable but competitive party system" 13 . The case of political party interaction at the European level seems an ideal laboratory to observe the transfer of normative elements embedded in party organisations' identity. While concentrating on European party federations, this article argues they should be seen as part of the triple party organisation, which also include the EP parliamentary groups and the national parties 20 . Social change entailed by Enlargement is too often identified with the activity of national governments or the European Commission. These institutions require compliance; indeed, they check and threaten, however they concentrate more on the control of legal adaptation than on norm interiorisation. The Commission is studied, rather, in the light of its material bargaining power as opposed to its social influence. This article argues that social change may be triggered by an institution considered "a backwater of Europeanisation" 21 , in this case, the European Parliament and related party networks.
In the following sections empirical evidence is provided to explain the mechanisms of Europeanisation (or the way in which the EU exercises its influence on the candidate state parties). The following hypotheses characterise the enlargement process:
1. Causal mechanisms: the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentiality coexist. Thus, the analytical challenge consists less in defining which of the mentioned logics dominates a process, but rather how they interfere with each other, at what moments the one prevails over the other, and how this evolution can be explained.
2. The essence of the process: focalising on generating compliance presents enlargement as a one-side process, giving no other way for the candidate side to adapt (or remain outside). Of course, the asymmetry of the EU / applicants relationship cannot be contradicted. Still, reducing the study of European influence to conditionality leaves little room to analyse the diversity of the impact and also the possible instrumentalisation of EU pressures through agents from CEEC 22 .
3. Actors: focusing on bureaucratic or governmental actors provides only a partial insight on the impact of EU governance outside the Union, especially as far as the normative pressures and social learning are concerned. Focusing the analysis on (not necessarily governmental) political actors, be they party leaders or representatives of party related foundations, throws new light on EU external governance. Generating compliance with EU norms may be a matter of socialising institutions such as party organisations.
What is not the point of this paper?
This paper does not aim to study the impact of enlargement on the party system in CEEC, although it is obvious that the EU influences national cleavages and forces domestic parties to adopt new logics of action while confronting them with a changing structure of political opportunities 23 . However, even if the EU variable plays strongly on the building of new cleavages, it seems difficult to isolate this variable as having a decisive influence on the format and mechanisms of political parties 24 . Many other domestic factors (local particularities, genetic factors, the transformation context) influence the building of new parties in CEEC. Thirteen years after the beginning of political negotiations leading to the end of Soviet domination in the region, the political landscape in some countries is still exposed to frequent recompositions.
This paper does not deal with "nation state identity" as mirrored in the discourse of political elites 25 . The span of one decade seems too limited to advance conclusions about a general redefinition of the state identity. Moreover, discourse analysis alone cannot account for a full explanation of identities' change. In a fluctuating political context, discourses evolve and are often instrumentalised with the aim of internal or external legitimisation. Therefore, looking for norms and ideas, we should concentrate not only on the official, but also on the unofficial discourses and political decisions. The analysis of norm diffusion requires the use of a larger number of methodological tools, encompassing both in-depth interviews with political leaders and experts, and the analysis of primary sources produced by the institutions studied, as well as official declarations and press reports.
Enlargement perceived as the Europeanisation of political representation structures
While speaking of the impact of EU enlargement, we apply the term Europeanisation to the analysed empirical processes. Although Europeanisation may seem a somewhat catchall term, it applies to the impact of the European networking mode of governance on political representation groups in CEEC. We opt for a definition which conceives Europeanisation as "an incremental process, reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making" 26 . Claudio analysing the ongoing change in political elites' identities and perceptions entailed by EU enlargement, the paper focuses on actors which take an active part in this process.
II. Enlargement of European party structures -between socialisation to European norms and a rational strategy
The process of the association of new parties to the transnational party federations may be analysed using contributions dealing with the role of norms in policy change. In recent years, authors concerned with institutional analysis provided evidence of a profound connection between rationality and norms. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink speak of "'strategic social construction', in which actors strategize rationally to reconfigure preferences, identities or social context". In fact, norm entrepreneurs act rationally, whereas rational choice may produce social knowledge. Thus, the debate is not about the predominance of rational choice or ideational change, but "about the role that choice plays in norm-based behaviour, about what motivates choice, and about the role persuasion plays in normative process and how to treat it" 29 .
March and Olsen's institutionalist perspective for international change offers a framework explaining the connections between the logic of expected consequences -based on exogenous preferences and interest calculations -and the logic of appropriateness -based on endogenous identity, cognitive dimensions and rules. As both logics coexist in influencing political decisions, their relationship may be conceptualised in one of the following models:
1. The clearer logic dominates the less clear one;
2. Each logic corresponds to major decisions and minor refinements;
3. There is an evolution from one logic into the other; 
Organisational and political adaptation
These criteria mark a starting point for intensive exchanges between parties from the EU and from CEEC. It meant a broad transfer of know-how to central European party elites on the functioning of European institutions, during delegations, traineeships and common seminars. Moreover, the Commission's avis concentrate mainly on economic conditions and legal transfers required by the acquis communautaire.
It may be argued that European party federations carried out an in-depth survey of their partners' effective norm commitment. The evaluation reports sent from partner organisations implemented in CEEC (such as the German political foundation) encompassed virtually the whole political spectrum, both government and opposition political parties. It must be noticed that these CEEC parties, whose strong commitment in favour of European integration and federalism is not in doubt, have been literally "pursued" (to use the words of an EPP representative) by the European party federations. When a potential member party respected all the normative criteria, the formal, technical barriers could be lessened. In the case of the Polish Union of Freedom (UW), for example, the observer member stage was bypassed for the first time (this stage was a non-written rule, however it had been observed till then). While not all UW members were part of the EPP group at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, this formality could be resolved a few months following the UW accession to the EPP, while in the case of other candidate parties failure to comply to this criterion could interrupt the association process. We may say that in this case that norm compliance logic was the rule and precondition of calculation, while rational calculation accounted for minor refinements.
Applying conditionality
Conditionality -the most frequently evoked feature of the enlargement mechanism -is present in a latent way in the association process of new members to European party federations, through the establishing of application conditions. However, the use of threats -whether of a social or a material kind -in case the potential candidates do not comply to the rules, seems to have been rather exceptional. Threats of interrupting dialogue and thus delegitimising a CEEC partner were used with regard to parties whose democratic commitment was questionable.
Constraint was applied regarding the Latvian party for Homeland and Freedom TB/ LNNK after its application in 1999. The party leaders' commitments were examined carefully, for example regarding their attitude towards the Meciar regime in Slovakia and minority protection. The EPP's working group Central and Eastern Europe announced that if the TB/LNNK voted against the law guaranteeing minority rights to Russians living in Lithuania, the EPP would cease its contacts with the party 37 .
Another means of pressure are long waiting periods, during which political leaders from candidate parties perceive they are tested regarding the internal functioning of their parties and their commitment to common values. This was the case with some conservative parties in CEEC, but also with post-communist parties, which had to go through a sort of quarantine immediately after 1989 before joining the club of social democracy 38 .
It appears that the transfer of norms may obey different mechanisms, ranging from teaching to various kinds of persuasion and even threats. The party federations may be perceived as teachers of norms 39 or socialising institutions 40 , which create meanings and promote specific concepts about the role of the state, human rights, EU governance etc. There is no evidence in our case that material bargaining dominated the enlargement process. Rather, legitimating and associating new party members from CEEC involved the activities of teaching and persuasion, through the multiplicity of delegations, forums and seminars.
The association of new party members in a rationalist-institutional perspective
According to the logic of expected consequences, the party federation enlargement process may also be considered as a range of bargaining, resulting in a compromise that reflects the interests of each side. In fact, internal and external party observers often advance rational calculation based on material criteria (the relative size and power of parties and federations)
as the essential factor explaining the association policy pursued in the 1990s.
The power calculation within transnational interactions
After 
Bilateral exchange of resources
According to rational logic, the European party federations may be considered as formal institutions providing the applicant party leaders with material and ideational resources that enable them to exploit favourable occasions for the evolution of their activity both on national and on European levels. Representatives of the EPP were a source of legitimacy and of international contacts for the CEEC political leaders. International legitimacy, factor of the national legitimacy and the need for social esteem are important motivations of the adaptation to norms 41 . During the pre-accession period, the European Union gradually became an arena of interest representation for the candidate states 42 . CEEC parties sought to get associated into party federations, which carry weight in the European Parliament 43 .
Also for the leaders of European party federations, the contacts with CEEC became a necessity in the context of the legitimacy crisis they underwent. For example, the party summits organised in candidate countries by the EPP are a media event and they serve the image of the federation, while the summits held in Brussels remain rather unnoticed. Opening to the new, often governmental, conservative parties in CEEC represented an opportunity for the European Christian Democrats to try and counter the decline they underwent in the second half of the 1990s.
The relationship between the two institutional logics
The association of new parties to European federations allows observation of the correlation between the strongly intertwined logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness. In fact, the logic of persuasion and of norm diffusion is often based on rational calculations.
The European party federations may be conceived as institutions 44 with their own rules and complexity that change, adapting to the new circumstances. The empirical evidence confirms our initial hypothesis, according to which both logics co-exist and are mutually dependent. Thus, it may be argued, the association of new member parties to transnational federations may be perceived as a result of rational calculation: the will to tie links with potential strong allies. However, other elements interfere, relative to identity, such as the establishment of adhesion criteria. In some situations these criteria may dominate the rational ones.
The enlargement of European party federations may also be defined as a principally normbased process. When focusing on the normative logic does not bring the expected results, the other logic may be called for (as it was the case with the initial focalising on the ideologically nearest families in CEEC). Thus, European party federations used new categories and innovative procedures in order to realise the enlargement to CEEC parties. Still, the basic norms (commitment to democracy and European integration) remained unchanged.
III. The actors of political enlargement -empirical evidence
Having drawn the main analytical lines of the enlargement process seen through the prism of political parties, this part should illustrate the mechanisms of change while focusing on agents participating in identity redefinition. German political foundations are publicly supported organisations, which have close links to the German political parties 45 . Owning representation bureaus both in Brussels and in the candidate states, they can be considered as important channels transmitting norms and values, but also political contacts. Their transnational activity at the European level distinguished them from other political organisations originating from EU countries 46 . The activity of political foundations may be analysed through the double prism of the Europeanisation of political parties: creating channels of transmission of a political culture; influencing the perception of the European Union by the candidate state political leaders as an interest representation arena.
While during the first half of the 1990s, the German engagement in CEEC concentrated on direct support for structural reforms and know-how transfer, entering the official preaccession process entailed a growing focalisation on EU matters. It appears that nongovernmental actors such as the German political foundations supported the process of norm compliance of EU enlargement using, however, the normative arguments appealing to identity construction (teaching, persuasion) rather than social and material conditionality. Unlike in the accession negotiations, the point was not to obtain compliance with stable, legal frameworks, but to find reliable political partners and to familiarise them with the political mechanisms of EU functioning.
Transmitting political culture. Foundations as agents of change.
Affiliated with the German Christian-Democratic Union, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) cooperates with the European People's Party in matters of international party dialogue.
During the 1990s, the expertise of the KAS helped the EPP -through the intermediary of the German CDU -to follow the political evolutions in CEEC.
Owing to their continuous presence in Central and Eastern Europe, foundation representatives could play an important role as intermediaries to transnational party contacts. They sent reports to party federations, informing them about the situation in CEEC, the evolution of the party landscape and details of internal tensions in local political parties. The direct and informal contact, particularly dense between the KAS, the German CDU and the EPP, The German political foundations may be considered -according to the sociologicalinstitutionalist perspective -as "norm entrepreneurs", which persuade their partners to redefine their identities and interests by engaging in a social learning process 47 . But it was also owing to the fact of representing the transnational network of European party federations that German foundations could promote ideas of European integration, federalism, subsidiarity or minority rights, knowing they could occasionally make use of conditionality arguments in order to achieve their objectives 48 Socialists. This kind of delegation of political contacts to a non-partisan, transnational body appears to be a necessity for the PES: "The pre-elections support for the CEEC social democratic parties is a very important activity of the European Forum. -This is something that we in the PES are simply not equipped to provide for the CEEC parties, at least not as material assistance. I am very happy that this is done by the Forum, and that it associates the PES in its work as it is truly a forum for coordination between different parties and foundations. This is the way to share the responsibility for the transition country parties observers to the PES between us and the European Forum" 
The impact of the norm transfers in the direction of CEEC parties
It appears difficult to isolate the impact of the European party organisations' networking on the perceptions of CEEC party leaders during a process that we consider to be based on The critical phase of accession negotiations requires more differentiation by analysing discourses, commitments and political decisions of Central European political party leaders, which can be studied with similar instruments to their Western sisters.
Conclusion
The association of political parties originating from the candidate states to European party federations gave way to normative pressures aiming at the overtaking by the applicants of a set of values, styles and ways of doing. This paper tried to illustrate and explain the way in which the rational "logic of consequentiality" interferes with the "logic of appropriateness" in the process of socialisation and differential empowerment, both essential components of the EU-induced change. The kind of EU governance CEEC experienced gave way to greater openness of the party leaders to discussions and bargaining in an international context.
Participating in a row of European forums and councils gives the CEEC participants a glimpse of belonging to the community and discussing among equals. The importance of these socialising forums should not be underestimated. Their absence could make the process of liberalisation and opening of political CEEC countries much longer.
This article tried to illustrate the mechanisms in which informal rules and norms embedded in the European transnational party networks are diffused to the political parties from CEEC.
Transfers are not unidirectional. The Eastward enlargement will probably affect the way decisions are taken at the European level, how political and regional coalitions are built, ideas are diffused and enclosed in political programs. This reality seems present now in the mind of European party decision makers: "EU states had to sit up and realise that this is just another part of Europe, not really too faraway, and in a relatively short period of time, these people will have representatives sitting in the European Parliament, requesting finance, contributing to decisions and, horror or horrors, getting a seat at the Commission and at the Council tables" 55 .
To conclude, some criticisms will be advanced concerning an exclusive focalising on conditionality. It is not to contest that conditionality holds an important place in the enlargement process. Still, it seems that: The ongoing accession procedure focalises our attention on the conditionality dimension.
However, keeping in mind the logic of appropriateness may preserve us from some mental
